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Municipal Ethics Remain a Hot Topic in Litigation: A 
1999 Survey of Issues in Ethics for Municipal Lawyers* 
Patricia E. Salkin1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Numerous decisions and opinions addressing legal ethics for local 
government lawyers and non-lawyer municipal personnel were reported 
in 1999. Cases and opinions addressed issues including: conflicts of in-
terest, dual office holding, the attorney-client relationship, application of 
state and government ethics laws to the legal profession, and judicial 
membership on local ethics committees.2 
Local government lawyers also continue to grapple with the chilling 
effects resulting from federal court decisions surrounding the issues of 
confidentiality, loyalty and the government attorney-client relationship,3 
and the recent holding by the Sixth Circuit narrowing the attorney-client 
privilege in the local government context.4 While it may be true that the 
Copyright © 2000 by Patricia E. Salkin. 
I . Patricia E. Salkin is Associate Dean and Director of the Government Law Center of Al-
bany Law School in Albany, New York. She is a Professor of Government Law and teaches a course 
in government ethics at Albany Law School. She is the editor of ETHICAL STANDARDS IN THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR: A GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT LA WYERS, CLIENTS AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS ( 1999). 
2. This article examines reported cases and opinions in 1999 dealing with all types of mu-
nicipal ethics issues. For a discussion of unique ethics issues that arise particularly within the context 
of municipal planning and zoning decision making, see: Patricia E. Salkin, 1998 Survey of Ethics in 
Land Use Law, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1393 ( 1999); and Patricia E. Salkin, Legal Ethics and Land 
Use Planninf(, 30 URB. LAW. 383 (1998). 
3. See, e.fi., In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 996 (1998); In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F. 3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997). For a discussion of the impacts of these 
cases, see, Paul L. Shechtman & Nathaniel Z. Marmur, Government Lawyer Confidentiality After 
Lindsey, I Gov'T LAW AND POL'Y J. 30 (Fall 1999); Norman Redlich & David R. Lurie, Federal 
Governmental Attorney-Client Privilefie Decisions May Prove Sifinificant to All Government Law-
yers, FOOTNOTES, Winter 1998-1999; and Note, Maintaininfi the Confidence in Confidentiality: The 
Application of the Attorney-Client Privilefie to Government Counsel, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1995 
(1999). 
4. See Reed v. Baxter, 134 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 1998). The court held in this case that the at-
torney-client privilege did not protect communications between a city attorney and the city manager, 
city fire chief and two city council members because the council members were deemed "third par-
ties" and their presence waived any potential privilege. The court went on to state that even if the 
attorney-client privilege exists in the municipal setting, the facts in this case did not satisfy the re-
209 
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federal courts have placed a burden on government lawyers, one court 
has stated clearly that "nothing prevents government officials who seek 
completely confidential communications with attorneys from consulting 
personal counsel."5 
One New York court summed up the difficulty in defining ethics and 
ethical conduct at the local government level by stating, "The Constitu-
tion does not provide an ethics manual for elected local government offi-
cials."6 While it is true that no such manual exists, municipal attorneys 
must be mindful of the heavy burden and responsibility in counseling 
municipal clients about appropriate courses of conduct based upon con-
stitutional, statutory, regulatory and local law provisions. Municipal at-
torneys must also consider the amorphous "community standards" crite-
ria that can change overnight but make the difference between what is 
and what is not acceptable behavior. 
II. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
A substantial number of municipal ethics issues revolve around con-
flicts of interest problems. Generally, these cases are born out of a con-
flict of interest relating to personal financial gain, such as in the case of 
contracts, employment or special considerations for family members. 
Other times, the issue may be, for lawyers, one of conflicting duties 
owed to clients and employers. 
A. Contracts 
A recent case out of Washington State illustrates the problems inher-
ent with municipal officials who have financial interests in contracts let 
out by the municipality. The elected Public Works Commissioner for the 
City of Raymond (Washington State) owns a rock quarry that provides 
rocks to contractors holding city contracts.7 Concerned about a potential 
conflict of interest, the Commissioner authorized, in writing, the city en-
gineer to approve all future change orders.8 In addition, the Commis-
sioner sought the advice of the city attorney, who responded in writing 
that precautions should be taken against possible conflicts.9 Subsequent 
quirements. See also, John Copelan, The Attorney Client Privilexe for Government Allorneys: To Be 
or Not to Be? 7 PUB. LAW. I (A.B.A., Winter 1999). 
5. Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1112. 
6. Masi Management, Inc. v. Town of Ogden, 691 N.Y.S.2d 706,722 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999). 
7. See City of Raymond v. Runyon, 967 P.2d 19 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998), petition for review 
denied 980 P.2d 1283 (1999). 
8. See id. at 25. 
9. See id. at 21. Specifically, the City Attorney recommended: 
(I) The City should ascertain whether any pre-arrangements existed between contractors 
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to his election to the position of Commissioner of Public Works, the of-
fice was abolished and the Commissioner was elected to the City Council 
where, again, it was alleged that the potential for conflicts of interest was 
present. 10 The subject of interests in contracts for municipal officials is 
covered in a Washington State statute. 11 The statute does not provide a 
strict bar against having any interest in a contract. For example, a mu-
nicipal officer could have an interest in a contract not exceeding $200 per 
month. 12 In the case of a noncharter optional city, as was the case here, a 
municipal officer may have an interest in city contracts made under the 
officer's supervision not to exceed $9,000 per year.13 Violation of the 
statute voids the contract(s) as to the official's interest, subjects the offi-
cial to a $300 fine, and requires forfeiture of public office. 14 The Court 
determined that the Commissioner was in fact the supervisor for all con-
tracts, a power that could not be delegated to someone else, and that con-
tracts entered into after he assumed office violated the plain language of 
the statute 15 despite the fact that he made well-intentioned attempts to 
avoid conflicts of interest. 16 
In Alabama, the Attorney General opined that a similar state statute17 
prohibits a member of a city utilities board, who happens to be the sole 
!d. 
and Runyon's (the Commissioner) business; (2) Runyon should not participate in discus-
sions regarding any such contracts; (3) Runyon should not vote on any contracts or mat-
ters in which he operated in a fiduciary capacity; and (4) Runyon should not supervise 
any contracts in which he might have a pecuniary interest. 
10. See id. 
ll. See WASH. REV. CODE§ 42.23 (2000). 
No municipal officer shall be beneficially interested, directly or indirectly, in any 
contract which may be made by, through or under the supervision of such officer, in 
whole or in part, or which may be made for the benefit of his or her office, or accept, di-
rectly or indirectly, any compensation, gratuity or reward in connection with such con-
tract from any other person beneficially interested therein. 
!d. at ~ 42.23.030. 
12. See id. at § 42.23.010. 
13. See id. at§ 43.23.030(6). However, the officer is required to disclose the contracts by 
public list, and where the municipal officer is a supplier or contractor, he or she cannot vote on the 
city's contract authorization. 
14. See id. at§ 42.23.050. 
15. Specifically, contracts that involved the purchase of rocks in amounts that exceeded the 
$9,000 statutory limit. 
!d. 
16. See City of Raymond v. Runyon, 967 P.2d 19,21 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). 
17. See ALA. CODE § 41-16-60 (1991 ). This statute provides: 
No member or officer of the ... governing boards of instrumentalities of counties 
and municipalities, including waterworks boards, sewer boards, gas boards and other 
like utility boards and commissions, shall be financially interested or have any personal 
beneficial interest, either directly or indirectly, in the purchase of or contract for any 
personal property or contractual service, nor shall any person willfully make any pur-
chase or award any contract in violation of the provisions of this article. 
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owner of an automobile dealership, from selling cars and trucks pur-
chased by the Board, with or without bids. 18 These types of opinions can 
be frustrating for local officials, particularly those who serve in a part-
time or volunteer role. While it may be true that in many cases contracts 
are awarded after a competitive bidding process, the public perception of 
an insider advantage would emerge if a local official won the contract. It 
is this perception, the mere appearance of impropriety, which ethics laws 
attempt to address. 
B. Employment 
Lawyers employed by local governments face a complex web of 
ethical considerations that include not only state and local ethics laws, 
but also the applicable code or rules of professional conduct. In a New 
Jersey case, the appellate court faced the issue of whether a defendant's 
constitutional right to a fair trial was violated when the defense counsel 
was also employed as a part-time municipal prosecutor in the same 
county where the trial took place. 19 The defendant, convicted of two 
counts of sexual assault and two counts of endangering the welfare of a 
child, alleged that he was "unaware of his attorney's municipal employ-
ment during the trial, and that he did not learn of it until long after the 
completion of his trial and sentence."20 In reversing the convictions and 
remanding the case for a new trial, the court held that it is impermissible 
for a part-time municipal prosecutor to represent a criminal defendant in 
the same county where he is employed.Z1 In reaching this conclusion, the 
court considered the potential for appearance of impropriety when meas-
ured by the frequency of antagonistic relations between a municipal 
prosecutor and a defense attorney. 22 The court went on to admonish that, 
"[ w ]hat happened here can 'undermine public confidence in our system 
18. See 254 Op. Att'y Gen. Ala. 30 ( 1999). 
19. See New Jersey v. Clark, 735 A.2d I (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999), cert. granted, 736 
A.2d 528 ( 1999). 
20. !d. at 4. 
21. See id. The court noted that it was specifically refusing to follow precedent in State v. 
Zold, 251 A.2d 475 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1969), aff'd, 264 A.2d 257 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1970), cert. denied, 270 A.2d 34 (N.J. 1970) because the court states that the "viability of its holding 
is questionable." /d. 
22. See id. The court cited, among other things, the fact that the part-time municipal prosecu-
tors are supervised by the county prosecutor; that conflicts of interest exist since county prosecutors 
often downgrade indictable offenses so they can be tried in the municipal courts, and prosecuted by 
the municipal prosecutor; that municipal prosecutors may conduct probable cause hearings in the 
absence of a county prosecutor; and municipal prosecutors may represent the State in a motion to 
suppress evidence. 
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of government and in the independence and integrity of the legal profes-
sion.'"23 
Another conflict of interest arises when a public employee is also 
self-employed and offers services that compete with her employer. In a 
Florida case, a county health department objected to the fact that the 
plaintiff, an employee of the department, was providing water-sampling 
services in competition with services provided by the Department's mi-
crobiological laboratory.Z4 The court held that this activity violated a 
Florida statute dealing with conflicting employment or contractual rela-
tionships by creating a continuing or frequently recurring conflict be-
tween the employee's private interests and the interests of the health de-
t t 25 par men. 
A Connecticut statute prohibits members of a zoning board or com-
mission from participating in decisions in which the member is directly 
or indirectly interested in a personal or financial sense.26 The Connecticut 
Superior Court recently applied the statute in Blinkoff v. Planning and 
Zoning Commission. 27 The plaintiff, a sand and gravel company, chal-
lenged the Planning and Zoning Commission's decision to allow the ap-
plicant, a separate sand and gravel company, to continue quarry opera-
tions that had gone on for more than ten years with periodic special 
exception permit renewals. The Plaintiff alleged that one of the commis-
sioners had a personal and financial interest in the application. The 
commissioner, an electrical contractor, had worked on several projects 
with the applicant, including the applicant's office building.28 Holding 
for the Planning and Zoning Commission, the court found that the plain-
tiff made a "naked assertion" without knowledge of any facts. In the 
three situations where the commission member performed electrical 
23. /d. at 6 (citing, In re Opinion 452 of the Advisory Comm'n On Prof. Ethics, 432 A.2d 
829 (N.J. 1981)). 
24. See Velez v. Comm'n on Ethics, 739 So.2d 686, 687 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
25. See id. at 687-88. The Florida statute provides: 
No public officer or employee of an agency shall have or hold any employment or 
contractual relationship with any business entity or any agency which is subject to the 
regulation of, or is doing business with, an agency of which he or she is an officer or em-
ployee, ... nor shall an officer or employee of an agency have or hold any employment 
or contractual relationship that will create a continuing or frequently recurring conflict 
between his or her private interests and the performance of his or her public duties or that 
would impede the full and faithful discharge of his or her public duties. 
FLA. STAT.~ 112.313(7)(a) (West Supp. 1999). 
26. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ~ 8-11 (West 1989). This statute provides in part: "No member of 
any zoning commission or board and no member of any zoning board of appeals shall participate in 
the hearing or decision of the board or commission of which he is a member upon any matter in 
which he is directly or indirectly interested in a personal or financial sense .... "; See also id. at ~ 8-
21 (articulating similar language for members of planning commissions). 
27. CV 980078081 S, 1999 WL 559585 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999). 
28. See id. at *3. 
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work involving the applicant, the commissioner's company won the job 
by being the low bidder in a competitive bidding process, and that appli-
cant did not give him the job "as a pay off for voting favorably on the 
application."29 
In a separate case, the Connecticut Superior Court also considered 
whether a conversation between the Chairman of the Commission and 
the applicant resulted in the appearance of impropriety. 30 The court noted 
that, "[l]ocal governments ... would be seriously handicapped if any 
conceivable interest, no matter how remote and speculative, would re-
quire the disqualification of a zoning official."31 This situation demon-
strates the need for communication between an applicant and the munici-
pality, yet the management of the communication by local officials in 
such as way as to not suggest the appearance of impropriety that could 
undermine public trust and confidence in the integrity of the decision 
making. 
The Alabama Supreme Court recently held that a teacher may not 
serve on a city board of education?2 Although a plain reading of the ap-
plicable Alabama statute suggests such a scenario could occur, the court 
found that such provisions could be severed from the section specifically 
denying such action.33 The court never reached the question of whether 
such a situation creates a conflict of interest requiring removal under the 
Alabama Code of Ethics for Public Officials.34 Although this case really 
centered on the issue of statutory construction, the possibility of a 
schoolteacher serving on the board of education for the district where 
he/she is employed does raise some interesting conflicts of interest is-
sues. 
In another case based on a procedural error, a North Carolina court 
declined to consider the petitioners' argument that their due process 
29. !d. 
30. Goyette v. Lebanon Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 112654, 1999 Conn. Super. Lexis 
148 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999). 
31. /d.at*l5. 
32. See Alabama v. Martin, 735 So. 2d 1156, 1160 (Ala. 1999). Alabama code section 16-
ll-2(b) provides, in part: 
The members of the city board of education, who shall, except as hereinafter provided, 
serve without compensation, shall be chosen solely because of their character and fitness, 
but no person shall be appointed or elected to this board pursuant to this section who is 
subject to the authority of the board. In cities having populations of not less than 50,000 
nor more than 60,000 according to the most recent federal decennial census, and the City 
of Attalla, not more than one classroom teacher employed by the board may serve as a 
board member and also as a classroom teacher. 
ALA. CODE§ 16-ll-2(b) (Supp. 1999). 
33. See Martin, 735 So. 2d at 1160. 
34. See id. It was not necessary to reach the question as the State's petition for a writ of quo 
warranto was to be granted. 
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rights were violated because a member of the county board of adjustment 
had been employed by the county planning department and during such 
employment had been consulted by the petitioners about the possibility 
of rezoning their property?5 Although the petitioners raised the allega-
tion of a conflict of interest on appeal, the court found that their due 
process rights were not violated because they did not object to the mem-
ber's presence on the board at the time of the hearing, and they made no 
showing to the court that they were prejudiced by the member's partici-
. . h 16 pat10n m t e case: 
C. Familial Relationships 
Municipal decision-makers should also be wary when they are in-
volved in municipal decisions that financially benefit a family member. 
In a case challenging the granting of a competing developer's subdivi-
sion proposal, the plaintiff alleged that his competitor had significant 
connections with the city council, including the fact that he was repre-
sented by the spouse of a town councilwoman.37 The plaintiff empha-
sized that the councilwoman made the motion to adopt the needed zoning 
code amendments, although he concedes that she did recuse herself 
months later when the applicant's project actually came before the coun-
cil for a vote. 38 Basing the plaintiff's arguments on equal protection 
grounds, the court declined to address the issue, stating that the question 
of whether the council member labored under a conflict of interest "must 
be determined under state law in a proceeding appropriate to the purpose 
(no suggestion one way or another should be inferred here)."39 Thus, a 
planning board itself is not necessarily infected with an alleged conflict 
of interest based upon the claim that a competitor applicant was locally 
favored because the competitor was represented by the spouse of a coun-
cil member, especially where that council member made the motion to 
adopt zoning code amendments favorable to the competitor.40 
A New York appellate court recently decided a zoning case involv-
ing familial relationships. In that case, the town board approved Cornell 
University's rezoning application to implement a new cooling system.41 
35. See JWL Invs., Inc. v Guilford County Bd. of Adjustment, 515 S.E.2d 715 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1999). 
36. See id. at 718. 
37. See Masi Management, Inc. v. Town of Ogden, 691 N.Y.S.2d 706, 722 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1999). 
38. See id. 
39. /d. 
40. See id. 
41. See DePaolo v. Town of Ithaca, 694 N.Y.S.2d 235, 238 (1999). 
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Although Cornell employed a town board member and a board member's 
spouse, the court held that these members did not have a conflict of in-
terest that was prohibited by statute.42 Similarly, a third board member 
who was married to a Cornell retiree did not have a prohibited conflict of 
interest since the spouse's pension benefits were outside the board's con-
trol.43 The court was satisfied that none of the board members had any 
direct or indirect interest, pecuniary or otherwise, in the application 
"such that their vote could reasonably be interpreted as potentially bene-
fiting themselves."44 
Situations such as this are not uncommon, particularly in small cities 
and towns where there is a major employer. Although the court found no 
legal basis for a violation of ethics laws in the present case, the New 
York Legislature, mindful of the appearances of these conflicts, amended 
the planning and zoning enabling acts in 1998 to address situations 
where conflicts may be present. The statute now allows for the appoint-
ment of alternate members to planning and zoning boards who could be 
called into service when a conflict of interest prevents a regular board 
b f · 4S mem er rom servmg. -
III. WHO IS THE CLIENT OF THE GOVERNMENT LAWYER? 
Government lawyers constantly grapple with the issue of who is their 
client.46 For example, is the client of a county attorney the county, the 
county legislative body, individual county commissioners, department 
heads, or the taxpayers of the county? A recent Utah case addressed this 
question when it asked whether the Salt Lake County Attorney had an 
attorney-client relationship with the County Commission and with each 
individual commissioner.47 Relying on the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct, the court concluded that an elected county attorney has an at-
42. See id. at 240. In relying on Sections 801 and 802 of the N.Y. General Municipal Law, 
the court found that "neither individual's employment duties involved the preparation, procurement 
or performance of any part of the [project], nor was their remuneration directly affected by the pro-
ject." !d. at 239. 
43. See id. 
44. !d. at 239. Also, a fourth board member was found to not have a prohibited conflict on 
interest although he was a graduate student at Cornell University whose tuition and stipend were 
paid for by a foundation unrelated to the Cornell and whose studies did not involve participation 
with the cooling project at issue. 
45. See 1998 N.Y. Laws 137 codified at: N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267 (McKinney Supp. 1998); 
N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW§ 27 (McKinney Supp. 1998); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW§ 7-712 (McKinney 1996 
& Supp. 1998). 
46. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Jeffery Rosenthal, Who is the Client of the 
Government Lawyer?, at 13 in ETHICAL STANDARDS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: A GUIDE FOR 
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, CLIENTS AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS, (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 1999); see also 
Reed v. Baxter, 134 F.3d 351 (6°' Cir. 1998). 
47. See Salt Lake County Comm'n v. Short, 985 P.2d 899,901 (1999). 
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torney-client relationship only with the county as an entity.48 In consider-
ing other state laws to determine whether there was any contradictory di-
rectives, the court examined the statutory mandates for county attor-
neys.49 The court found nothing explicit in these statutes to suggest that 
the county attorney has an attorney-client relationship with each individ-
ual commissioner or with the commission as a group of individuals.50 
The court further found that the county attorney has a dual role: 1) to 
act as an attorney for the county; and 2) to carry out her statutory duties 
as an elected official. As such, the duties given to the county attorney 
may create a conflict among the attorney, the commission and the com-
missioners.51 In addressing the question of when a county commission 
may hire outside counsel, the court determined that "the County must be 
represented by the elected attorney in all matters falling within the scope 
of the attorney-client relationship unless that person cannot act, either 
because of a refusal to do so, an incapacity, or a disqualification, as by a 
conflict of interest."52 Such a determination is fact-intensive, and the 
court reminded the parties that there are three ways to resolve these is-
sues: I) the parties may settle the matter among themselves; 2) the par-
ties may appeal to the Attorney General's office for an opinion; or, 3) as 
in the case at bar, the parties may resort to the courts by seeking a de-
claratory judgment.53 
IV. JURISDICTION OF ETHICS INVESTIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
MUNICIPAL LA WYERS 
Determination of jurisdiction in ethics investigations can be difficult 
when the investigated attorney also holds a municipal office. The Penn-
48. See id. at 902. See also UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.13(f) (2000). 
This rule provides that any "lawyer elected ... to represent a governmental entity shall be consid-
ered for the purpose of this rule as representing an organization. The government lawyer's client is 
the governmental entity except as the representation or duties are otherwise required by law." /d. 
Rule 1.13(a) states that "[a]lawyer retained or employed by an organization represents the organiza-
tion through its duly authorized constituents." /d. 
49. Prior to 1993, the Utah Code stated that the "county attorney is the legal adviser of the 
board of county commissioners." UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-18-2 (1995). This section was amended to 
read, "[t]he county attorney is the legal adviser of the county. He must attend meetings of the county 
legislative body when required, and must oppose all claims and accounts against the county when he 
deems them unjust or illegal." /d. at* 17-18-2 (1999). The Utah Code also directs the county attor-
ney to "give, when required and without fee, an opinion in writing to county, district, precinct, and 
prosecution district officers on matters relating to the duties of their respective offices." /d. at §17-
18-1.5(5)(c). Finally, the Utah Code states that the county commission "may control and direct the 
prosecution and defense of all actions to which the county is a party." /d. at§ 17-5-219. 
50. See Short, 985 P.2d at 905. 
51. See id. 
52. /d. at 907. 
53. See id. 
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sylvania Supreme Court held that its exclusive jurisdiction to regulate 
ethical and professional conduct of attorneys does not prohibit the State 
Ethics Commission from investigating the city solicitor's activities.54 The 
investigation centered on the lawyer's representation of the city through 
his private law firm55 while simultaneously serving as City Solicitor.56 
After determining that a solicitor is in fact a public official or public em-
ployee for purposes of applicability of the State Ethics Act,57 the court 
reached the constitutional issue of the separation of powers claim be-
tween the judiciary and the executive branch. In a strong affirmation of 
the power of the State Ethics Commission to investigate alleged wrong-
doing on the part of municipal attorneys, the court stated, "[a]ppellant 
attempts to use his status as a member of the Bar of Pennsylvania as a 
shield protecting him from investigation by the Ethics Commission."58 In 
characterizing the solicitor's argument as "absurd" the court reiterated 
that while it does have exclusive jurisdiction over the conduct of lawyers 
as it applies equally to all members of the Bar, this jurisdiction "is not 
infringed when a regulation aimed at conduct is applied to all persons, 
and some of those persons happen to be attorneys."59 
54. See P.J. S. v. State Ethics Comm'n, 723 A.2d 174, 178 (Pa. 1999). Specifically at issue 
was a ethics statute that provided, in part: 
(a) No public official or public employee shall engage in conduct that constitutes a con-
flict of interest. 
(f) No public official or public employee or his spouse or child or any business in which 
the person or his spouse or child is associated shall enter into any contract valued at $500 
or more with the governmental body with which the public official or public employee is 
associated or any subcontract valued at $500 or more with any person who has been 
awarded a contract with the governmental body .... 
65 PA. CONS. STAT. § I 103(a),(f) (2000). Although not at issue in the case, findings were made by 
the State Ethics Commission alleging that the solicitor used city equipment, staff and materials in 
pursuing his outside legal practice. P.J.S., 723 A.2d at 175 n.3. 
55. Although the lawyer was employed full-time by the city, he had an agreement with the 
mayor that since he could have flexible hours, he may be able to maintain a private Jaw practice as 
well as fulfilling his city appointment. See id. at 175. 
56. See id. 
57. See id. The court determined that the solicitor was an employee under Section II 03 of the 
Ethics Act which defines a public employee as: 
Any individual employed by the commonwealth or political subdivision who is responsi-
ble for taking or recommending official action of a nonministerial nature with regard to: 
(I) contracting or procurement; (2) administering or monitoring grants or subsidies; (3) 
planning or zoning; (4) inspecting, licensing, regulating or auditing any person; or (5) any 
other activity where the official action has an economic impact of greater than a de 
minimus nature on the interests of any person. 
65 PA. CONS. STAT.§ 1103 (2000). 
58. P.J.S., 723 A.2d at 178. 
59. /d. 
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V. DUAL OFFICE HOLDING 
The issues surrounding dual office holding regularly arise in small, 
more rural municipalities where it can be difficult to recruit willing vol-
unteers into public service. It can also arise where one person simultane-
ously holds two public sector jobs in an effort to earn a full-time salary. 
In some situations an intentional decision is made to have a local official 
serve on another official board for the purposes of information exchange 
and continuity. Whatever the reasons for dual-office holding, the situa-
tion often creates appearance problems for the office holders. 
The Superintendent of the Recreation Services Division of the City 
of Stamford (Connecticut) directed an employee not to accept additional 
part-time employment as a referee or umpire for various local athletic 
events sponsored by the city.60 Although the employee did not directly 
assign officials to the various games, two employees supervised by him 
were responsible for the assignments.61 The Superior Court upheld the 
superintendent's directive, which further stated that the employee's ac-
tions represented "a practice that does not present the proper image that I 
want the Department to have."62 The employee had a letter from the local 
board of ethics opining that his refereeing of city-sponsored games did 
not constitute either a real or apparent conflict of interest.63 However, the 
court felt that the issue was not whether the employee was accused of 
unethical conduct, but "whether the city is justified in prohibiting him 
from conduct that the plaintiff's supervisor believes gives her division an 
undesirable image in the community."64 
A similar decision by the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a 
township trustee could not also be the county delinquent personal prop-
erty tax coordinator because the offices were incompatible under the In-
compatible Offices Act.65 The trustee had discussed and voted on 
whether the township should contract with the county for the county to 
60. See Troy v. City of Stamford, CV 990169739, 1999 Conn. Super. Lexis 1456 (Conn. Su-
per. Ct. 1999). 
61. See id. at * l-2. 
62. !d. at *2-3. 
63. See id. at *2. Actually, even though the teams paid the referees and not the city, there had 
been allegations that the employee was getting choice assignments based upon his city employment 
status. 
64. !d. at *6. 
65. See MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN.§ 15.182 (West 1994) (providing that, "a public officer or 
public employee shall not hold 2 or more incompatible offices at the same time."); !d. at§ 15.181(b) 
(defining incompatible offices as, "public offices held by a public officials which, when the official 
is performing the duties of any of the public offices held by the officials, results in any of the follow-
ing with respect to the offices held: (i) The subordination of I public office to another. (ii) The su-
pervision of l public office by another. (iii) A breach of duty of public office."). 
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provide collection services for delinquent personal property taxes. 66 The 
court ordered the official to resign from one of her offices stating, 
"[a]bstaining from any official action in an attempt to avoid the incom-
patibility does not remedy a breach of duty; vacating one of the offices is 
the only solution to the problem."67 
The official also claimed that the county prosecutor had acted in di-
rect conflict with his statutory duty to give advice and counsel to the 
county treasurer when he filed the discretionary action seeking her re-
moval. The official also brought allegations that such action on the part 
of the county prosecutor violated the Michigan Rules of Professional 
Conduct.68 The court dismissed these arguments stating, "indeed, if we 
accept defendant's argument, it is questionable whether the prosecutor 
could prosecute an employee of the treasurer's office for embezzlement, 
should the situation present itself."69 
The Kentucky Court of Appeals examined whether the same person 
could serve on both the local legislative body and on the county planning 
commission.70 After reviewing compatibility provisions in the State Con-
stitution71 and statute,72 and considered the common-law of incompatibil-
ity of dual office-holding, the court held that the two positions present an 
inherent conflict of interest with respect to zoning matters.73 In conclud-
ing that the two offices were "functionally incompatible," the court 
found that both due process and public policy prohibit the simultaneous 
service.74 The court also rejected the notion that abstention from the vote 
66. See Macomb County Prosecutor v. Murphy, 592 N.W.2d 745 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). 
67. /d. at 748. 
68. Although rule 1.7 of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a lawyer from 
representing one client if the representation will be directly adverse to another client, or if the repre-
sentation may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or third person, 
or by the lawyer's own interest, Rule 1.13 states that when a lawyer represents an organization, the 
lawyer represents the organization "as distinct from its directors, officers, employees, members, 
shareholders, or other constituents." MICHIGAN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCf, Rule 1.13(a) 
(1999). 
69. Macomb County Prosecutor, 592 N.W.2d. at 751. 
70. See Lagrange City Council v. Hall Bros. Co, Inc., 3 S.W.3rd 765 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999). 
71. Section 165 of the Kentucky Constitution provides: 
No person shall, at the same time, be a State officer or a deputy officer or member 
of the General Assembly, and an officer of any county, city, town or other municipality, 
or an employee thereof; and no person shall, at the same time, fill two municipal offices, 
either in the same or different municipalities, except as may be otherwise provided in this 
Constitution. 
KYCONST. § 165. 
72. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 61.080 (Michie 1998) (enumerating twelve offices it deems 
incompatible). 
73. See Latvange, 3 S.W.3rd at 770. 
74. /d. 
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at the planning commission level would remedy the conflict between the 
0 0 75 two positions. 
In Michigan, a state statute specifically allows for one member of a 
township planning commission to simultaneously serve on the town-
ship's zoning commission.76 The Michigan Attorney General, however, 
opined that it is a violation of the Incompatible Public Offices Act77 for 
more than one member of a township planning commission to simultane-
ously serve as a member of the township's zoning board of appeals. The 
zoning board of appeals reviews decisions of the planning commission, 
and the planning commission could influence the actions of a member of 
the zoning commission, thereby creating the possibility of a breach of 
public duty.78 Based upon the analysis in the most recent opinion, it re-
mains peculiar that the legislature continues to authorize dual member-
ship for one member of the planning commission/zoning board of ap-
peals. 
Modifying a previous opinion,79 the Ohio Attorney General opined 
that since Ohio law permits zoning commissions to organize in such way 
as to have its members also serve as secretary of the commission on a ro-
tating basis, it is within the discretion of the board of township trustees to 
75. See id. at 771. Furthermore, even though the council member abstained from the vote 
below, he did take part in the discussions at the meetings of both bodies and he voted on the matter 
when it was before the second body for consideration. Interestingly, the court then went on to ab-
solve the council member from any personal unethical conduct by stating: 
/d. 
There is absolutely no evidence in the record to indicate that Hoffman has any personal 
or financial interest in the outcome of the vote of the proposed zoning map amendment. 
Furthermore, Hoffman's decision to abstain from the vote before the Planning Commis-
sion demonstrates a desire to avoid any appearance of impropriety. We merely hold that 
public policy mandates that Hoffman cannot simultaneously hold positions as a member 
of the City Council and of the Planning Commission. 
76. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 125.331, 125.288(1) (West 1997). This dual office 
holding has been upheld by the Michigan Attorney General in previous opinions where the Attorney 
General stated, among other things, "[t]he Legislature may, of course, expressly authorize the simul-
taneous holding of two public offices that would otherwise be incompatible." 1995-1996 Mich. Op. 
Att'y Gen. No. 6837 (1995). See also, 1985-1986 Mich. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 6268 (1985). 
77. The Act defines "incompatible office" as: 
Incompatible office" means public offices held by a public official which, when the offi-
cial is performing the duties of any of the public offices held by the official, results in any 
of the following with respect to those offices held: 
(i) The subordination of I public office to another. 
(ii) The supervision of I public office by another. 
(iii) A breach of duty of public office. 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §15.18l(b) (West 1994). 
78. See 1999 Mich. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 7012. 
79. See 1957 Ohio Op. Atty. Gen. No. 1052 which, relied on an earlier version of the state 
statutes (R.C. 519 .05) opined that "public policy prohibits a commission member from being paid to 
perform the duties of commission secretary if the latter position is a salaried position under the au-
thority of the commission on which the member serves." /d. 
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determine whether and what amount of additional compensation may be 
paid to the member serving as secretary at each meeting.80 While the dual 
office holding question has long been settled as not a violation of an 
ethical standard, the question of additional compensation to board mem-
bers for performing the additional record-keeping tasks was a new mat-
ter. Since it was not the zoning commission that set the compensation, it 
was discretionary with another body, and because the zoning commission 
members rotated the responsibility, the Attorney General found no im-
. 81 propnety. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has granted review to consider 
whether an attorney may simultaneously serve as a municipal attorney 
and borough clerk/administrator for the same municipality,82 and whether 
a municipal planning board attorney may also serve as a public defender 
in the same municipality.83 
VI. MEMBERSHIP ON LOCAL ETHICS COMMITTEES 
The Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee for the State of Delaware 
advised a superior court judge that he must decline an invitation to serve 
as chair (as well as declining membership) of a school district's ethics 
review committee.84 After considering relevant Cannons of the Delaware 
Judges' Code of Judicial Conduct,85 the Committee indicated concern 
that the work of the ethics review committee could become controversial 
and might ultimately result in litigation in the superior court.86 The 
Committee opined that although in such circumstances, the judge could 
recuse himself from any such cases, the potential option of future judicial 
recusal did not justify service on the local ethics review commission. 87 
80. See 1999 Ohio Op. Atty. Gen. 99-035 (1999). 
81. See id. 
82. See In the Matter of the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, 736 A.2d 522 
(1999). 
83. See In re: Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, ACPE Docket No. 1-99, 1999 
N.J. LEXIS 1182 (N.J. 1999). 
84. See In re Your April20, 1999 Request for an Opinion from the Judicial Ethics Advisory 
Committee, JEAC 1999-1, 1999 WL 743525 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999). 
85. Including: Cannon 2, "A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropri-
ety in all activities"; Canon 4, "A judge may engage in activities to improve the law, the legal sys-
tem, and the administration of justice"; and Cannon 5, "A judge should regulate extra-judicial activi-
ties to minimize the risk of conflict with judicial duties." 
86. See In re Your April20, 1999 Request for an Opinion from the Judicial Ethics Advisory 
Committee, JEAC 1999-1, 1999 WL 743525 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999). 
87. See id. 
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Vll. ELECTIONS 
An attorney who is "of counsel" to the law firm of the attorney rep-
resenting an unsuccessful candidate for the office of mayor is not eligible 
to make the required certification of a practicing attorney that an inde-
pendent assessment of the claim has been made.88 Certification is re-
quired in Mississippi by two practicing attorneys that each has, "fully 
made an independent investigation into the matters of fact and law upon 
which the protest and petition are based and that after such investigation 
they verily believe that the said protest and petition should be sustained 
and that the relief prayed therein should be granted."89 After discussing 
the definitions and roles of attorneys who have "of counsel" relationships 
with law firms, the court concluded, "[g]iven the close, regular, personal 
relationship between attorney and law firm contemplated by the ABA 
where the 'of counsel' designation is employed ... an attorney listed as 
being 'of counsel' on the letterhead of the firm representing the contest-
ant ... is not eligible to make the certification required by the Election 
Code."90 
VITI. BAD FAITH 
The issue of ill-conceived motivations or bad-faith on the part of lo-
cal officials may properly be viewed as a question of ethics or ethical 
conduct by those vested with the public trust. The cases where these al-
legations, correctly or incorrectly, are being made appear to be growing 
at an alarming rate and should signal both a warning and a cause for con-
cern to local officials. For example, in a Wisconsin case, petitioners 
claimed that they were denied a fair and impartial hearing when, after a 
4-1 vote to approve the petition for a reclassification by the county plan-
ning and survey committee, the Chair of the Committee erroneously rep-
resented to the county board of supervisors that the vote had been 3-2, 
that she voted against it (she did not). 91 Furthermore, prior to the vote by 
the board of supervisors, the Chair of the Town Board was alleged to 
have made the following misrepresentations: that the petitioners were 
real estate developers who had ulterior motives; that the town residents 
were anti-development; and that she failed to correctly state the reasons 
88. Esco v. Scott 735 So.2d 1002 (Miss. 1999). 
89. /d. (citing 7 ANN. MISS. CODE § 23-15-927 (West 1999)). 
90. /d. at 1005. 
91. See Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 593 N.W.2d 878 (Wis. 1999). 
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in the petition for their request.92 Although the claim was dismissed on 
procedural grounds,93 the allegation of bias and the resulting public per-
ception of the conduct of local officials in these situations goes a long 
way to erode the public trust. 
In another case, an alleged equal protection violation by an applicant 
that a competing developer was locally favored and that the other appli-
cant was represented by the spouse of a town council member did not 
contain sufficient evidence to prove that, "selective treatment was based 
on impermissible or discriminatory animus against a cognizable group or 
class of individuals, or that plaintiff was maliciously singled out for dis-
parate treatment because of the exercise of constitutional rights, or bad 
faith intent to injure plaintiff."94 As the court correctly points out, the 
federal circuit courts are not in agreement on the issue of whether evi-
dence of malicious or bad faith intent to injure will support an equal pro-
tection claim.95 The United States Supreme Court has an opportunity, 
however, to provide further guidance with the granting of certiorari in 
I 999 of the Olech case arising out of the 7th circuit.96 
A claim based upon prejudice and bias as a reason for failing to ex-
haust administrative remedies was not supported where the crux of the 
allegation was that a hearing now by the people appointed to fill vacan-
cies on the Board of Adjustment after the filing of the litigation would be 
futile since, "any Board formed would be comprised of individuals who 
were prejudiced and biased against the Petitioner and therefore would be 
predisposed to rule against him."97 In fact, the record revealed that the 
three individuals appointed to fill vacancies were not part of any opposi-
tion to the application, nor did they participate in the matter in any other 
forum, leaving nothing to suggest that they would act other than impar-
. ll 98 t1a y. 
92. See id. at 882. 
93. The petitioners filed a federal claim alleging a deprivation of due process. but they failed 
to assert their state claim remedy which rested with a certiorari review. 
94. Masi Management, Inc. v. Town of Ogden, 691 N.Y.S.2d 706, 722 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999). 
95. See id. at 902, reciting a string of conflicting circuit court cases. 
96. See Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. granted,_ 
U.S._, 120 S. Ct. 10 (1999). 
97. Cheswold Aggregates v. Town of Cheswold, No. 99M-02-0009HDR, 1999 WL 743339 
(Del. Super. Ct. 1999). 
98. See id. at *2 (quoting Phillips v. Board. of Educ. of Smyra Sch. Dist., 330 A.2d 151, 154 
(Del. Super. Ct. 1974)). 'There is a presumption that public officials discharge their duties and per-
form the acts required of them by law in accordance with the law and the authority conferred upon 
them and that they act fairly, impartially and in good faith." !d. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
With more than two dozen reported cases and optmons in 1999 
where the central issue was ethical conduct of a local government offi-
cial, government lawyers need to continue to meet the challenge of keep-
ing current on trends on the field of government ethics. There is no trea-
tise on government ethics, no national newsletter devoted exclusively to 
the field, nor a web site where these types of cases and opinions are typi-
cally summarized and searchable. Thus, government lawyers must be 
creative in their research path and mindful of jurisdictional differences in 
the law and in community values and standards that have so much to do 
with determining whether the conduct complained of is in fact unethical. 
Government lawyers need to be proactive and play a leadership role in 
the training of municipal officials about the wide array of potential ethics 
allegations,99 demonstrated through the microcosm of a look at the types 
of cases and matters arising in 1999 and reported in this article. 
99. For a discussion of easy strategies for lawyers that are designed to educate local officials 
on ethics issues see, Patricia E. Salkin, Ten Effective Strategies for Counseling Municipal Clients on 
Ethics Issues, 22 STATE & LoCAL LAW NEWS I (Fall 1998). 
